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I. Why Do Phishing Attempts Still Work?
Despite numerous efforts to raise awareness about phishing scam emails, the
number of phishing attacks continues to grow significantly each year. According to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), between 2014 and 2018 phishing
complaints increased more than 20%, with the financial losses increasing more than
100%, amounting to a total loss of $7.45 billion (FBI, 2018). The email phishing
attacks of today are an evolution of similar techniques that can be traced back at
least to the 19th century. Exploring the history of pre-internet swindling schemes
helps draw a bigger picture of the current phishing and scamming methods. One of
the most common 19th-century techniques was the “Spanish Prisoner Letter” where
the scammer made a request to their target audience for token amounts of money
to help the prisoner to retrieve their treasures. The Spanish Prisoner Letter scam
continued to evolve with changing storylines and targets through the regular mail
services until the postal inspectors noticed the flood of scam mail items and started
warning people about it (Train, 1910).
We generated an idea for modeling key factors of digital phishing, such as
prevalence, frequency, and effectiveness. However, finding a corpus of recent
phishing emails proved to be almost impossible due to privacy and user information
concerns. Companies are reluctant to provide researchers with phishing emails
targeted at their server and users because they may hold sensitive information. After
the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal data came to light, companies and
organizations became more stringent and wary about releasing data to researchers.
We contacted several data centers and information researchers about sharing
phishing emails for research purposes, but they all refused for the above-mentioned
reasons. We turned to our home institution, the University of North Texas (UNT)
email server.
II. Background for a Model
a. Distinguishing Deception from Lying
Lying is an act of delivering a false statement to a victim with the intention of
making the target believe the statement. Deceiving someone requires intentionally
causing the victim to believe a premeditated set of actions and speeches that will
shape a false notion (Mahon, 2015). The two terms are often used interchangeably,
though we rely here on a subtle difference – where “to lie” simply means to tell an
“untruth,” “to deceive” has its roots in “to ensnare, to trap.” Deception is usually
done with illusions and tricks of facts to make targets fall into the trap (O’Connor,
Copeland & Kearns, 2003). According to one study, humans lie at least once a day
(Feldman, Forrest & Happ, 2002).
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b. Psychology of Deception
Phishing attacks typically rely on the psychology of deception. Deception in its
various forms results from pervasive and adaptive phenomena. Dating back to the
1920s, entomologists (Wheeler, 1926) began studying and attempting to categorize
levels of social behavior in animal species by observing parenting styles and mating
rituals of different insects and animals. Socio-biologists (Wadsworth, Wilson &
Barker, 1975) further expanded the species by looking at social behavior patterns
of insects and animals into rudimentary forms of deceptive activity within and
among different species. Knowledge of these rudimentary forms of deceptive
activities led to a deception hypothesis in comparative psychology. Non-humans
display different deception practices according to their surroundings, ranging from
household pets seeking attention, to wild animals evading predators, and
hierarchical groupings of apes and wolves. In humans a progression of these
deceptive activities advances into a manipulative type of premeditated deception
commonly seen in humans.
Premeditated deception is a behavior deliberately planned for a personal
gain of advantage over another by hiding the truth or manipulating facts. In a study
with fifty infants, Reddy (2008) found that infants as young as six months old
pretend to cry just to attract the mother’s attention (Reddy, 2008). Knowledge of
deception dates, at least, back to the creation myths of the Abrahamic religions
(Qur’an 2:35–36). Nowadays, technology has helped in creating new techniques
and methods of deception that are enhanced by the expansion of human interaction.
Engaging with targets is no longer limited to personal contact or slow and costly
distant contact with a fairly small number of people; the digital environment
essentially erases most boundaries and barriers.
c. Email Deception Theory
An electronic mail (email) vector is a specially crafted and distributed method of
enticing targets to perform actions that will make their personal data available to
attackers. The email vector is advantageous to the phishers because of the ease of
distribution to a large quantity of recipients at very low cost. Furthermore, it
conceals the geographical location of the sender. The FBI has modeled the typical
steps in the phishing lifecycle (Figure 1). This lifecycle can vary in duration
depending on the final goal or attack method of the phishing perpetrator. Email
phishing is typically initiated with a target acquisition process which begins when
an individual visits any online location which has less than optimum security
features, as in step 1. Perhaps the most critical part of the lifecycle is step 2
(grooming), because the success of the entire phishing attack relies on successfully
gaining the trust of the target. Step 3 is characterized by the exchange of
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information between the target and the attacker. The attackers gather information
relevant to the final goal by asking questions, seeking sympathy, implanting
malware on the target’s communications device, or directing the target to a specific
online location that surreptitiously harvests information such as passwords and user
information, or sometimes seeking nude photos for a future blackmail. In step 4, if
the overall goal of the phishing attempt is solely monetary extortion as is the case
of individual petty phishing scam, the attacker demands payment via wire transfer
of funds to a location of the attackers choosing. If the phishing attack is only a
portion of a larger scheme, further information or direction is given to the target
with a laundry list of expectations to fulfill. Varying technical approaches are used
at different stages of these phishing attacks.

Figure 1: Email Phishing Steps (FBI, 2018)
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III. Foundational Theory for Modeling Successful Phishing
We used the functional ontological construction (FOC) model, which was proposed
by Anderson (2006) as a pragmatic approach to understanding the relationship
between human behavior and the information environment. The model emerges
from the application of behavior analytic theory to problems in information science.
FOC is a multicomponent model which relies heavily on empirical history and
behavioral analysis. The first component of the model is based on a binary model
of documents inspired by Shannon and Weaver’s information theory, Eco’s theory
of semiotics, Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, Skinner’s theory of verbal
behavior, and Dawkins’ theory of memes (Dawkins, 2014; Eco, 1986; Shannon &
Weaver, 1948; Skinner, 1957; Wittgenstein, 1953). The second component of the
model is based on the functional ontological space that engages both the user and
document in a common ontological context. This ontological context covers
behaviors such as information seeking by users, and the preference for documents
that satisfy user needs. The third component of the model is based on the functional
ontological implications of the model. User interaction with documents has a
selective function on the user behavior, and in turn the user behavior has a selective
function on the document. The model is sometimes referred to as ABC because it
is formed around Antecedents, Behaviors, and Consequences.
IV. Framework and Methodology
Email communication offers large information carrying capacity and a nearly
ubiquitous information sharing channel, especially in a higher education institution
such as University of North Texas (UNT). UNT’s email server, known as
EagleConnect Email System, serves the official email communication needs of
students, employees, retirees, and alumni; and as of March 10, 2021, the UNT email
system has over 251,000 accounts and an average of close to 40,000 active monthly
users. Also, UNT’s staff and students send a monthly average of 10,000 emails and
receive 110,000 emails, and the UNT’s staff and students read close to 30% of the
received emails. The email accounts are hosted on the Microsoft Office 365
platform, and therefore emails are automatically filtered for phishing attempts
through the Microsoft Office 365 filtering system. Microsoft Office 365 has over
258 million active on-premises or cloud-based exchange users spanning across
schools, healthcare, financial services, companies (70% of Fortune 500
companies), and governments. The phishing emails used in this study successfully
bypassed the Microsoft office 365 phishing filtering systems to reach the email end
user. The end users had reported the phishing emails to the network administrator
who archived the email samples on a different email folder. The simple fact that
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these phishing emails passed through a rigorous and well-regarded filtering system
demonstrates that they were good at deception.
Over the period from October 17, 2018, to October 10, 2019, 432 phishing
emails that passed the Microsoft Office 365 filtering system were reported and
archived on the UNT server for a period of 12 months. The emails have different
features, characters, length, context, and semantics; thus, the collected data is
unstructured. While we had a significant sample of phishing emails, privacy
policies presented the methodological challenge of not being able to reach out to
the phishing email targets to gather detailed data from their end of the transactions.
V. Results and Analysis
Our explorations revealed that UNT staff and students are more heavily targeted
with phishing emails in the Summer, and during the holiday season when students
and staff are more likely to need extra money. Most successful deception emails
were found to start by forming an engaging email subject line. We found that email
scammers used the information theory gap as a bait to fool email recipients to open
phishing emails. According to Ben-Haim (2006), information gap theory is “a nonprobabilistic decision theory for prioritizing alternatives and making choices and
decisions under deep uncertainty.” For example, marketers often form a shadowy
link title to draw viewers’ attention to click on the link such as “how to become rich
in few steps.” In our corpus, scammers used a completely blank subject line in fifty
emails (~15%) to deceive recipients into opening the phishing email. Ambiguity is
a strong stimulus to humans, and it is being used by scammers to encourage human
curiosity to open phishing emails (Livio, 2017).
In the quantitative analysis of the corpus, TF-IDF and LDA were useful in
analyzing documents and raw text to provide insight into the topics of the
document. The results from the LDA and TF-IDF analyses present similar
outcomes despite the differences in statistical models. The results from both models
show that the corpus has three primary topics: finance, jobs, and technology.
In the qualitative analysis of the corpus, we used the categories derived by
Cofense, formerly PhishMe, a leading provider of human-driven phishing defense
solutions and we manually categorized the emails into six categories:
opportunity/reward, curiosity, urgency, fear, job, and social/entertainment. The
graph shows the distributions for email per category (see Figure 2 below).
Also, we categorized the emails by reinforcer type – essentially promise of
a reward or threat of a punishment. We found that most scammers used a positive
reinforcer with 131 phishing emails in the corpus, a stimulus that promises positive
feedback such as a job offering. Next, scammers used the penalty technique in 74
phishing emails where the target is being threatened with losing something;
commonly the scammer asks recipients to update their login credentials, or they are
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going to lose access to their email inbox. In 56 of the phishing emails there were
general negative reinforcements where the type of the negative reinforcer is not
specified. For example, a scammer might try to steal the identity of a person in
authority and send an email to one of the employees with something like “Let me
know when you are available.”. Moreover, in 43 of the emails in the dataset
scammers use the information gap theory to get a reply from targets; commonly,
they send an email such as: “Are you available” to get a reply. Since it is not known
what the scammer wants, these types of emails could fall into both positive or
negative reinforcement category. The phishing emails that came under both
categories have no indications or signs what the scammer is asking for unless the
recipient of the phishing email replies to it and that is why it could be both positive
reinforcer or negative reinforcer. In 22 of the emails the reinforcement was
punishment negative, in which a scammer blackmails a target by threatening to
expose them online unless there is payment with cryptocurrency.
In only 20 of the 432 phishing emails (~5%) involved any response
exchange between email recipients and phishing attacker. The other 95% of
phishing emails were reported to the information security team without
communication with the attacker. Of those 20 responses, 14 were prompted by
credit card phishing attackers posing as a superior requesting a subordinate
employee to purchase redeemable gift cards for a company or personal event. The
targets of the credit card attacks reported these phishing emails after at least one
reply to the attacker, though the data show no email recipient actually made the
requested purchase. The remaining six of the response-exchanged phishing emails
were in three categories: malicious files, job offerings, and a request to pay a bill.
Only two of the phishing email recipients from the twenty response-exchanged
emails fell for the phishing attack. One fell victim to a false job offering and lost
about $3,000 to the attacker, while the other employee fell for a malicious attack.
VI. Documenting Phishing Emails
We built an analysis tool by Elastic on the findings of this research for easier data
collection in the future and to create automated reports about the phishing emails
that the organization is targeted with. We used the programming language PHP to
create an app to connect the IMAP server to Elasticsearch and parse the emails and
attachments into meaningful fields in Elasticsearch. The analysis tool runs indexes
to extracts the important fields from each email to Elasticsearch every night, as
shown in Table 1. The collected emails in Elasticsearch can be easily extracted to
CSV files or any other formats for future research and analysis.
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Figure 2: Visualization of the Indexed Phishing Emails

Table 1: Indexed Phishing Email
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VII. Creating a Visualized Phishing Email Report with Kibana
Kibana is an add-on that can be installed on the top on Elasticsearch to add a userfriendly interface to Elasticsearch with no need of a knowledge of coding to use
Elasticsearch. Kibana gives users the ability to customize slides with different
metrics in with the option selecting time period. In a matter of seconds, the
visualization metrics can be adjusted easily and can show phishing emails that dated
back to March 2014 since the creation of the phishing emails inbox. Figure 2 is a
screenshot of a visualization of the emails that the information security team
received since 2014.
VIII. Deception in Phishing Emails Model
Figure 3 summarizes how scammers form their phishing emails. Firstly, if it is a
spear phishing attack or a regular email phishing attack, scammers choose a topic
depending on the pervious information they know about the target either as an
individual or as an organization. Then, scammers pick from the five available
categories to decide what type of reinforcement to use. Then they decide between
encouraging the email recipients in a nice way or threatening them with a
blackmail. Lastly, scammers form their phishing email with attractive wordings that
fits their attack and words that bypass the respective filtering systems.

Figure 3: ABC model of Phishing Emails
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IX. Conclusion
In this study, phishing emails that successfully passed through the Microsoft 365
email filtering system to the UNT staff and students were reported and archived in
a phishing email inbox by UNT’s security team as the primary dataset. Our dataset
contained 432 phishing emails that were archived between October 2018 and
October 2019. The phishing emails were studied from both technical and
psychological angles to identify why an advanced filtering system such as
Microsoft 365 email phishing defense system failed to prevent delivery of these
phishing emails.
In this research, we used a mixed method to analyze the data. In the
quantitative analysis, we used topic modeling and TF-IDF to get an overview of
what are the topics of the studied email corpus. We found out that the emails could
be categorized into three topics namely: jobs, finance, and technology. On the
qualitative side of the analysis, we used Anderson’s functional construction
ontology theory to study the interaction between a human and a document, and we
discovered that scammers use positive and negative reinforcement with different
types of stimuli as a motivation to swindle email recipients. Furthermore, we
categorized the emails into 6 different categories based on the reinforcements used:
opportunity or reward, job, urgency, curiosity, fear, and social/entertainment.
Based on B. F. Skinner’s reinforcement theory, we identified that all four
different types of theoretical stimuli were used to defraud email recipients. The
attackers used positive reinforcement to promise a prize or reward to the email
recipient, and they used negative reinforcement to threaten the email recipients with
unwanted potential consequences.
In addition, we observed that attackers used the information gap theory to
scam email recipients by sending them either empty email subject or empty email
body. This information gap technique accounted for 30% of the emails in our
corpus having either an empty subject or body.
Moreover, a statistical visualization showed that the university staff
received more phishing emails in the summer and winter holiday seasons. This
seasonality was further explored to identify that some of the universities staff not
paid during the summer months usually search for temporary jobs to fill the pay
gap, and the attackers take advantage of this opportunity to offer fake job openings
to their targets.
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